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On Measuring Indebtedness of African Countries: 
A Stochastic Frontier Debt Production Function 
 
 
 
Guy Blaise Nkamleu*
 
 
Abstract 
At least since the early 1990s, the problem of Africa’s debt was a recurring theme in the 
development debate and many suggestions for debt relief have now been implemented. 
However, a thorough solution is hampered by the existence of multiple ways of scaling 
debt. This paper provides a framework for comprehensively measuring indebtedness and 
gives therefore a basis for setting objective principles for debt reduction measures. The 
paper uses a stochastic frontier production function approach and the technical efficiency 
computation procedure to develop an indebtedness index for 46 African countries. The 
results indicate an indebtedness index across countries ranging from a minimum of 
3.6 (South-Africa) to a maximum of 92 (Zambia), with an average of 69. Countries, 
which have experienced extended civil wars, are generally less indebted, while countries 
with more corrupt governments have generally contracted more multilateral debt. The 
paper ends by raising a number of implications for a better approach of debt management 
in Africa. 
 
 
Résumé  
Au moins depuis les années 1990, le problème de la dette africaine est un thème récurrent 
dans les débats sur le développement, et plusieurs propositions sur l’effacement de la 
dette sont aujourd’hui mises en œuvre. Cependant, les débats sont entravés par 
l’existence d’une multitude de façon de mesurer l’état d’endettement d’un pays. Cet 
article propose un cadre conceptuel permettant de mesurer complètement l’endettement, 
donnant ainsi une base pour mettre sur pied des principes objectifs sur lesquels pourront 
s’appuyer les initiatives de réduction de la dette. L’article utilise une approche par la 
frontière de production stochastique et la procédure de calcul des efficacités techniques 
pour développer un indice d’endettement pour 46 pays africains. Les résultats donnent un 
indice d’endettement des pays variant d’un minimum de 3,6 (Afrique du Sud) à un 
maximum de 92 (Zambie), avec une moyenne située à 69. Les pays ayant connu une 
guerre civile majeure apparaissent être relativement moins endettés, tandis que les 
gouvernements les plus corrompus ont généralement contracté plus de dettes 
multilatérales. L’étude se termine en relevant un certain nombre d’implications pour une 
meilleure approche de gestion de la dette en Afrique. 
 
                                                 
* International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). I am grateful to Akin Adesina who inspired this 
work. Thanks are also due to Bernhard Gunter for insightful comments and valuable inputs. The views 
expressed and errors are solely those of the author. Comments are welcome; please send any 
communication directly to the author: g.nkamleu@cgiar.org. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Foreign debt represents an important source of finance in most African countries 
where it supplements low savings, narrow export earnings, and thin tax bases. The main 
reasons for external borrowing by a sovereign country are to smooth consumption over 
time and to allow a country to invest more now with less of a sacrifice of current 
consumption. The costs of the external borrowing are supposed to be covered by the 
future returns from the investment. However, in Africa, much of the debt repayments 
have been rescheduled repeatedly, with the effect that Africa’s debt has continued to 
climb virtually unabated during the 1980s and early 1990s. For many African countries, 
the situation has been severe, with the debt overhang having a negative impact on new 
investment and economic growth.  
 
The severity of a country’s debt burden is often expressed in terms of its debt 
servicing obligations—the repayments of principal and interest due in a given year. A 
common rule of thumb is that the debt service due should not exceed 25 percent of a 
country’s export earnings. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the debt servicing problems 
became both more general and more intractable. First, following the 1973 oil shock and 
the subsequent global recession, many African primary-producing countries encountered 
balance-of-payments difficulties. Then, after the sharp rise in world interest rates in the 
early 1980s, most middle-income countries that had borrowed from banks were unable to 
service their debt. 
 
The need to resolve the debt problem overshadowed many other development 
issues. Thus, improving the quality of external debt management has become a vital 
aspect of public administration. Given the tenacity of the debt crisis and the growing 
recognition of its role in blocking renewed economic growth, many people have come to 
accept that some sort of debt relief is necessary. However, despite a variety of debt relief 
plans by financial institutions and individual creditor governments, the African debt has 
continued to climb until very recently. Tanzania for example has been spending nine 
times more for debt servicing than for basic health and four times more than for primary 
education. In Africa as a whole, where only half of the children go to school, 
governments transferred four times more to northern creditors in debt payments during 
the mid-1990s than they spent on health and education (United Nations Development 
Programme, 1999). 
 
 Reasons for the failure of debt relief plans in terms of their contribution to 
effective debt reduction, economic growth, and poverty alleviation is partly attributed to a 
lack of international coordination among creditors, given that various donors do not 
implement the same policies and may have quite different objectives. The development 
assistance literature has long focused on the opposition between self-interest behaviors, 
linking aid to post-colonialist and geopolitical motives of donors, and altruistic behaviors, 
relating aid to recipient needs and merits (Berthelemy, 2004). 
 
In 1996, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, agreed to 
undertake a new comprehensive approach, called the Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
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(HIPC) Initiative, providing debt relief to the poorest and most indebted countries in the 
world. In September 1999, the international community reinforced this initiative, 
transforming it into the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in order to provide deeper and faster 
debt relief. In June 2005, the Group-of-Eight (G-8) major industrial countries proposed 
that three multilateral institutions—the African Development Fund (AfDF) the 
International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)—cancel 100 percent of their debt claims on countries that have 
reached the completion point under the enhanced HIPC Initiative. This G-8 Initiative has 
become known as the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). 
 
The MDRI implies that creditor countries use the HIPC eligibility criteria as a 
way to exclude certain countries from MDRI debt relief, possibly to suit their own 
political interests, as they clearly existed in the past. For example, Marijke (1998) 
reported that, France insisted on the inclusion of its former colony, Côte d’Ivoire, by 
requesting the IMF and World Bank to change the HIPC eligibility rules such that Côte 
d’Ivoire would qualify for HIPC debt relief. In addition, NGOs have charged that debt 
sustainability levels are being interpreted by the World Bank and IMF so as to provide 
the least amount of debt relief possible and that, their interpretations is driven by their 
own institutional imperatives (Marijke, 1998; Kapijimpanga, 1998). While many 
improvements have been made in recent years, eligibility and conditionality issues still 
need more transparency and analysis. 
 
A first source of divergence is rooted in the existence of multiple measures of the 
debt burden. Debt and debt servicing payment can be measured in its nominal form, or 
can be scaled against gross national product (GNP), against exports, population, resource 
endowment, etc., giving rise to different rankings of countries in terms of indebtedness. It 
is therefore important to find an objective way of gauging the indebtedness of African 
countries, in order to be able to identify the countries that need debt relief. The objective 
of this paper is to determine an indebtedness index of African countries based on an 
international comparable macroeconomic dataset. The paper uses a stochastic frontier 
production function approach and the technical efficiency computation procedure to 
develop such an indebtedness index.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter II presents the general 
theoretical concepts underlying the stochastic frontier approach used in the paper. The 
third chapter discusses the empirical results, and the last chapter presents conclusions and 
implications of the study. An annex provides some details on the data used in this study. 
 
Chapter II: Analytical Approach 
 
The stochastic production frontier model was independently proposed by Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). The original 
specification involved a production function for cross sectional data with an error term with 
two components: one to account for random effects and another to account for technical 
inefficiency. The model specification has been extended to accommodate different 
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distributional assumptions for the inefficiency term, for panel data, and for time-varying 
technical efficiencies. 
 
Empirical results are obtained by using the stochastic frontier production model 
with time-varying inefficiency effects, proposed by Battese and Coelli (1993). Our 
starting point is a supposed debt production function. Suppose that the total debt stock 
facing a country is a function of country’s characteristics and performance. This implies 
that with an appropriate functional form, the total debt stock of each country and each 
year can be directly forecasted. 
 
The debt frontier production function can then be defined as the curve of 
maximum debt stock attainable by a country with a given set of characteristics. The 
notion of debt index introduced in this paper is directly related to the classical notion of 
technical efficiency, and can be defined as the ratio of a country’s actual debt stock to the 
technically maximum possible debt stock at the given level of characteristics. 
 
Adapting from the standard stochastic production frontier, our debt stochastic 
production function is written as: 
 
4,.....,1;46,.....,1);()( ==−+= tiuvXfYLn itititit β    (Eq. 1) 
 
Where Yit is the debt stock of the i-th country in time period t, Xit is an N*1 vector of the 
logarithm of characteristics of the i-th country in time period t, β is a vector of unknown 
parameters. vit are random variables, which are assumed to be iid N(0, σ2v), and uit is a non-
negative random variable distributed iid N(ηit, σ2u), associated with technical inefficiency 
across units. In our case, it accounts for heterogeneity across countries that can cause 
departures from maximum potential debt stock. vit and uit are assumed to be independent of 
each other. 
 
The ratio of observed debt stock relative to its potential maximum debt is used to 
define the indebtedness index (Dit) for the i-th country in period t. 
 
]exp[
]);(exp[ itit
it
it uvxf
YD −=+= β        (Eq. 2) 
 
This measure of indebtedness index takes on value of zero to one, with a value of 
one indicating maximum indebted situation. It can also be thought of as indicating the 
size of the debt stock of the i-th country at time t relative to the debt generated by a fully 
indebted country having the same characteristics. 
 
The expected value of country-specific inefficiency term “ui” is defined by 
following Jondrow et al. (1982) as the conditional mean of ui , given “εi = vi - ui” 
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where σ, σu , and σv are the standard errors of ε, u, and v, respectively, λ defined as the 
ratio of standard errors in non-symmetric to standard errors in symmetric disturbances (λ = 
σu/σv). And σ = (σu2 + σv2)1/2 and f(.) and F(.) are the standard Gaussian density function 
and the cumulative distribution function, respectively, both evaluated at ‘εi/σ’. 
 
A number of empirical studies (Nkamleu, 2004; and Nyemeck, Sylla, Diarra and 
Nyambi, 2003) have estimated stochastic frontiers and predicted firm-level efficiencies 
using these estimated functions, and then regressed the predicted efficiencies upon firm-
specific variables in an attempt to identify some of the reasons for differences in 
predicted efficiencies between firms in an industry. But the two-stage estimation 
procedure has also been long recognized as one, which is inconsistent in its assumptions 
regarding the independence of the inefficiency effects in the two estimation stages 
(Coelli, 1996). From a recent development, the frontier methodology now lends itself to 
the inclusion of potential determinants of country heterogeneity, which is referred as 
“inefficiency effects”. We follow Battese and Coelli (1995) and specify a frontier model 
where the technical inefficiency effects are defined to be an explicit function of country-
specific institutional and sociopolitical factors that we hypothesized to influence 
country’s indebtedness index. 
 
The technical inefficiency effect uit for the i-th country at the t-th period as stated 
above has a truncated iid N(ηit, σ2u), where the mean is: 
 
δη itit z= ,          (Eq. 4) 
 
where δ is an 1×p vector of parameters to be estimated. And zit is a p×1 vector of 
variables which may influence the indebtedness index of a country. As described in more 
details in the Annex, the variables considered include geographical location, colonial 
heritage, political rights and civil liberties, and experience of conflict. The Battese and 
Coelli (1995) technical inefficiency effects model will be used to simultaneously 
investigate indebtedness measures and factors, which may explain differences in index 
levels between countries. 
 
Chapter III: Results 
 
Almost all African countries are facing huge external debts as highlighted in 
Table 1. In this analysis, we are focusing on two main forms of debts: multilateral claims 
and official bilateral loans. Other types of external debt such as direct bank loans and 
non-bank trade credits are not considered in this paper. From Table 1, it is clear that both 
multilateral and bilateral loans are large. In 2002, the average debt stock per country was 
slightly over US$2.5 billions. Compared to other geographical regions in Africa, by large, 
countries in the Northern part of the continent have a greater debt stock. The average debt 
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of the four Northern African countries surpassed US$8.5 billion in 1999. This was over 
four times greater than average for the 15 West African countries. 
 
To determine the influence of country’s characteristics on the debt stock, a Cobb-
Douglas function was estimated with panel data. The dependent variable is the nominal 
sum of multilateral and bilateral debt for each country for the years 1999–2003. Ordinary 
least square (OLS) estimates of the debt production function parameters are presented in 
Table 3, while descriptions of the variables included as independent variables are given in 
Table 2. The adjusted R-squared indicates that the fitted regression equation explain 74 
percent of the variation in country’s debt stock. 
 
Table 1: Average Country Debt Stock by Region (in millions of US dollar) 
 Year  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bilateral debt 4899 4584 4352 4653 
Multilateral debt 3691 3382 3218 3195 
Northern 
Africa (n=4) 
Total debt 8589 7966 7571 7848 
Bilateral debt 486 461 466 504 
Multilateral debt 1475 1397 1368 1510 
Western 
Africa (n=15) 
Total debt 1961 1858 1834 2014 
Bilateral debt 850 749 825 906 
Multilateral debt 863 826 790 963 
Central Africa 
(n=8) 
Total debt 1714 1575 1615 1869 
Bilateral debt 535 503 499 548 
Multilateral debt 1642 1612 1631 1838 
Eastern Africa 
(n=16) 
Total debt 2178 2114 2130 2386 
Bilateral debt 229 184 160 102 
Multilateral debt 249 251 236 246 
Southern 
Africa (n=3) 
Total debt 478 435 396 347 
      
Bilateral debt 933 866 858 924 
Multilateral debt 1539 1470 1446 1593 
All Africa 
(Average per 
country, 
n=46) 
Total debt 2473 2336 2304 2517 
Source: “Joint BIS - IMF - OECD - World Bank Statistics on External Debt” 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, the total debt stock of African countries is positively but not 
significantly associated with the population size. We found a positive and significant 
effect of value added in the agricultural sector, while the value added in services had a 
negative effect. This implies that the more the services sector is developed the lower the 
debt stock will be ceteris paribus. The results on agricultural sector imply that an increase 
of the value added in the agricultural sector is associated with an increase in total debt. 
This is a bit deceiving result giving the central role of the agricultural sector in the 
development process of African countries. Another important determinant of nominal 
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debt stock is the value of export of goods and services. The positive sign of its coefficient 
suggest that the more the country will export, the more the debt stock will be. This 
translates the fact that debt is mostly given to those who have means to easily reimburse. 
However, some of these independent variables may be regarded as endogenous if they 
bear a two-way relationship with the dependent variable. In this model, all independent 
variables included are considered exogenous.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Debt Production Function 
 Description Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
POPTOT Population size 17909297 145000 132785000 23477521 
AGVALUE Value added in agriculture 
(current US$) 
2094088301 9386910 16604404190 3243351033 
INDVALUE Value added in 
industry(current US$) 
3839138622 7925571 40697172900 8383497046 
SERVALUE Value added in 
services(current US$) 
5861468168 29043384 85876932960 13770799815 
GCAPFOR Gross capital 
formation(current US$) 
2310632106 13361026 20826991220 4390443598 
EXPORT Export of good and 
services(current US$) 
3534422648 15367706 36588830500 6779605559 
FDI Foreign direct 
investment(current US$) 
287028323.70 200000 7270300000 692971262.16 
 
 
Table 3: Parameter Estimates for Cobb Douglas Debt Production Function 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio P-value 
ONE -5.448 0.682 -7.989 0.000  *** 
LPOPTOT 0.151 0.098 1.541 0.123 
LAGVALUE 0.584 0.104 5.598 0.000  *** 
LINDVALUE -0.110 0.124 -0.888 0.375 
LSERVALUE -0.182 0.109 -1.666 0.096  * 
LGCAPFOR -0.075 0.120 -0.622 0.534 
LEXPORT 0.256 0.105 2.427 0.015  *** 
LFDI 0.039 0.039 1.001 0.317 
R-square = 0.74; Number of cross-sections = 46; Number of time periods = 4; LogL = -153.16 
 
As shown in the recent literature on the determinants of aids (Svensson, 1999 and 
Berthelemy, 2004), aid is driven by both donor’s interests and recipients’ needs. We were 
expecting to see a negative effect of foreign direct investment on debt stock, but this was 
not the case. This lack of significance may be pointing out a weak absorptive ability of 
African countries. As pointed out by Li and Liu (2005) the beneficiary effects of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) are generally stronger in those countries with a higher level of 
institutional capability.  
 
A frontier debt production function was estimated with panel data for 49 countries 
and five time periods using FRONTIER 4.1 (see Coelli, 1996). This frontier indicates for 
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each country, given its characteristics (gross domestic product, population, etc.) the 
maximum debt stock attainable. 
 
 
Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Parameters of the Stochastic Debt 
Frontier and the Inefficiency Effects Models 
 Coefficient standard-error t-ratio 
Stochastic Debt Frontier Model 
Constant -4.874 0.381 -12.789 
LPOPTOT 0.486 0.069 7.004  *** 
LAGVALUE -0.026 0.084 -0.310 
LINDVALU 0.036 0.089 0.400 
LSERVALU 0.055 0.090 0.614 
LGCAPFOR -0.077 0.062 -1.239 
LEXPORT 0.188 0.057 3.305  *** 
LFDI 0.068 0.024 2.810  *** 
   
Inefficiency Effects Model 
Constant -5.889 3.710 -1.587 
Northern region -5.149 2.629 -1.959  ** 
Central region 0.697 0.959 0.727 
Eastern region -0.143 0.385 -0.371 
Southern region 3.971 1.410 2.816  *** 
English countries 1.674 1.330 1.259 
Spain/Portuguese countries 0.663 0.879 0.754 
War recovering countries 2.921 1.519 1.924  ** 
Politically free countries 2.394 1.015 2.359  *** 
  
Variance Parameters 
Sigma-squared 1.859 0.598 3.108  *** 
Gamma 0.970 0.009 103.842  *** 
  
Total sample = 173 
LogL function = -97.24 
 
*** = Significant at 1 percent; ** = Significant at 5 percent; * = Significant at 10 percent.  
Source: Model results 
 
 
The computed value of Gamma 97.022
2
=+= vu
u
σσ
σγ  is shown in Table 4 and is 
interpreted to be an indicator of the relative variability of the two sources of random error. 
As γ approaches zero, the relative variation implies that σu approaches zero and/or σv 
approaches infinity, and this indicates that the symmetric error “vi” dominates in the 
determination of the sum of error ‘ε’. This means that the discrepancy between the observed 
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and the frontier debt stock for a given country is primarily due to random factors beyond the 
control of the country. Similarly, when the coefficient γ becomes large, the discrepancy 
between the observed and the frontier output is mainly the result of heterogeneity across 
countries that can cause departures from maximum potential debt stock. The value of γ is 
significant at 1 percent. This means that the technical inefficiency (ut), representing the 
degree of “failure” to produce the maximum debt from a given set of characteristic plays 
a substantial and statistically significant role. 
 
The indebtedness indices were measured for each country and each year. The 
results are presented in Table 5. Over the period 1999–2002, the mean indebtedness index of 
African countries was 68.8. However, countries did not have the same performance in 
attracting (or preventing) debts. Some countries such as Zambia or Egypt have an 
indebtedness index greater than 90, while Angola for example has an index which is less 
than 20. Recall that the index represents the ratio of current debt stock relative to the 
potential maximum debt. Hence, an index of 100 indicates a maximum indebtedness 
situation for a given country. These results highlight the extent to which efforts are needed 
to target the reduction of African debt. 
 
Parameter estimates for the stochastic frontier and technical efficiency effects 
model show that systematic technical inefficiency effects exist and that these are, in part, 
explained by the variables included in the model. The parameter estimates for the 
inefficiency model presented in Table 4 only indicates the direction of the effects these 
variables have upon indebtedness indexes (where a negative parameter estimate shows 
that the variable has a positive effect on indebtedness index). Four variables in the 
inefficiency model have a significant impact on indebtedness index. The coefficient for 
Northern region was significant and negative, implying that countries in the Northern part 
of the continent are more efficient in contracting debts (or less efficient in preventing 
debts) than West African countries (Variable for Western region is used here as base). 
Contrary, it appears that countries from the Southern part of the continent have a relative 
lower indebtedness index. The positive sign of the coefficient of “war recovering 
countries” suggests that non-war countries are more indebted than war recovering 
countries. This can be explained by the fact that countries, which have experienced a 
major civil war in the course of the last two decades, have long constituted a major risk for 
investments and loans.  
 
Finally, we also found a negative relationship between politically free countries and 
indebtedness. Countries rated “politically free” by Freedom House are relatively less 
indebted. This is a result with very important implications and corroborates the findings of 
Svensson (1999). It suggests that, either democratic countries are relatively well managed, 
and are successfully preventing themselves from debt, or it may indicate that creditors are 
more interested to give credit to dictatorial governments rather than democratic 
governments. It has been demonstrated that long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on 
the degree of political and civil liberties in the recipient country (Svensson, 1999). Aid has a 
positive impact on growth in more democratic countries. This suggests that in searching 
solutions to African debt crisis, an important step will be to answer the question “who gives 
credit to whom and why” (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
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Table 5: Indebtedness Index of African Countries 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean 
Algeria 0.835 0.765 0.712 0.698 0.753 
Angola 0.182 0.181 0.178 0.192 0.183 
Benin 0.640 0.637 0.650 0.665 0.648 
Botswana 0.253 0.201 0.193 0.187 0.208 
Burkina 0.700 0.606 0.642 0.702 0.663 
Burundi 0.867 0.761   0.814 
Cameroon 0.858 0.838 0.816 0.826 0.834 
Cape Verde 0.629 0.629 0.709 0.752 0.680 
Central Africa Rep. 0.747 0.743 0.675 0.722 0.722 
Chad 0.555 0.517  0.557 0.543 
Comoros 0.647 0.562  0.609 0.606 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.805 0.749 0.862 0.851 0.817 
Congo, Rep. 0.826 0.768 0.831 0.836 0.815 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.902 0.895 0.892 0.901 0.897 
Djibouti 0.473 0.495   0.484 
Egypt 0.914 0.899 0.896 0.902 0.903 
Eritrea 0.106 0.125 0.258 0.263 0.188 
Ethiopia 0.545 0.501 0.625 0.678 0.587 
Gabon   0.859 0.882 0.871 
Gambia 0.545 0.517 0.516 0.583 0.540 
Ghana 0.889 0.890 0.883 0.898 0.890 
Guinea 0.841 0.860 0.880  0.860 
Guinea-Bissau 0.815 0.843 0.816 0.815 0.822 
Kenya 0.821 0.769 0.762 0.778 0.782 
Lesotho 0.538 0.503 0.482 0.513 0.509 
Madagascar 0.797 0.749 0.741 0.870 0.789 
Malawi 0.849 0.868 0.819 0.898 0.859 
Mali 0.823 0.693 0.657 0.675 0.712 
Mauritania 0.891 0.865  0.886 0.881 
Mauritius 0.364 0.279  0.305 0.316 
Morocco 0.904 0.902 0.865 0.891 0.891 
Mozambique 0.884 0.883 0.867 0.875 0.877 
Niger 0.766 0.638 0.614 0.747 0.691 
Nigeria 0.383 0.307 0.282 0.294 0.317 
Rwanda 0.827 0.761 0.777 0.841 0.802 
Sao Tome 0.896 0.889 0.880 0.885 0.887 
Senegal 0.836 0.845 0.855 0.852 0.847 
Sierra Leone 0.704 0.721 0.746 0.797 0.742 
South Africa 0.047 0.043 0.032 0.024 0.036 
Sudan 0.667 0.545 0.527 0.539 0.569 
Tanzania 0.741 0.731 0.729 0.771 0.743 
Togo 0.752 0.731 0.695 0.720 0.724 
Tunisia 0.917 0.903 0.908 0.914 0.911 
Uganda 0.754 0.748 0.766 0.790 0.765 
Zambia 0.923 0.924 0.916 0.917 0.920 
Zimbabwe 0.728 0.722 0.747 0.733 0.732 
      
Mean 0.698 0.667 0.689 0.698 0.688 
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A simple correlation between indebtedness and corruption indices from 
Transparency International shows clearly that corrupt countries are significantly more 
indebted (Table 6). The limited data availability for corruption prevents us from using 
this variable in the estimation model. However, we can see from Table 6 that based on 
the Pearson correlation of different debt categories and the corruption index that 
multilateral creditors seem to provide more loans to corrupt countries than other 
creditors, with the World Bank, the African Development Bank Group, and the IMF 
being the three major multilateral creditors. Hence, the results suggest that part of the 
money received from these institutions might have been used to satisfy government’s 
own non-productive goals. 
 
Table 6: Pearson Correlation of Debt versus Corruption Indexes 
 Bilateral debt Multilateral 
debt 
Total debt Indebtedness 
index 
Corruption index (from 
Transparency 
International) 
-0.024 -0.29 *** -0.139 -0.229 ** 
 
The indebtedness index for selected institutional variables shown in Table 7 
confirms the results of the econometric model and stresses the potential role of 
institutional and socio-political factors on debt contraction. Table 8 provides the ranking 
of the countries in terms of their indebtedness status and gives another insight of the debt 
situation of African countries. The ranking shows clearly that the most indebted countries 
are not necessarily those with higher nominal debt stock. 
 
Table 7: Average Country Level for Selected Variables 
Countries Indebtedness index 
Political Freedom 
Not-Free 0.70 
Partly Free 0.73 
Free 0.54 
 
Geographical location 
North-Africa 0.86 
Western Africa 0.72 
Center Africa 0.70 
Eastern Africa 0.69 
Southern Africa 0.25 
 
Colonial heritage 
Former French colonies 0.75 
Former English colonies  0.61 
Former Spain/Portuguese colonies  0.69 
 
Countries that have experienced a major war 
Non-War 0.71 
War 0.62 
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Table 8: Ranking of African Countries According to Indebtedness Status 
Ranking  (from more 
to less indebted) 
Using per capita 
debt stock 
Using debt stock 
relative to GDP 
Using our 
indebtedness index 
1 Gabon Sao Tome Zambia 
2 Sao Tome Guinea-Bissau Tunisia 
3 Cape Verde Malawi Egypt 
4 Tunisia Burundi Cote d'Ivoire 
5 Congo, Rep. Sierra Leone Morocco 
6 Zambia Zambia Ghana 
7 Mauritania Mozambique Sao Tome 
8 Cote d'Ivoire Mauritania Mauritania 
9 Djibouti Congo, Dem. Rep. Mozambique 
10 Guinea-Bissau Ghana Gabon 
11 Morocco Gambia Guinea 
12 Ghana Togo Malawi 
13 Senegal Mali Senegal 
14 Mauritius Rwanda Cameroon 
15 Lesotho Congo, Rep. Guinea-Bissau 
16 Gambia Madagascar Congo, Dem. Rep. 
17 Guinea Niger Congo, Rep. 
18 Comoros Comoros Burundi 
19 Malawi Guinea Rwanda 
20 Egypt Central Africa. Rep Madagascar 
21 Mozambique Lesotho Kenya 
22 Cameroon Chad Uganda 
23 Togo Ethiopia Algeria 
24 Zimbabwe Senegal Tanzania 
25 Botswana Uganda Sierra Leone 
26 Algeria Cote d'Ivoire Zimbabwe 
27 Sierra Leone Cape Verde Togo 
28 Benin Tanzania Central Africa. Rep 
29 Mali Benin Mali 
30 Madagascar Kenya Niger 
31 Central Africa. Rep Burkina Cape Verde 
32 Kenya Djibouti Burkina 
33 Rwanda Cameroon Benin 
34 Burundi Zimbabwe Comoros 
35 Uganda Gabon Ethiopia 
36 Chad Eritrea Sudan 
37 Tanzania Tunisia Chad 
38 Niger Sudan Gambia 
39 Congo, Dem. Rep. Morocco Lesotho 
40 Sudan Egypt Djibouti 
41 Burkina Nigeria Nigeria 
42 Angola Algeria Mauritius 
43 Ethiopia Angola Botswana 
44 Eritrea Mauritius Eritrea 
45 Nigeria Botswana Angola 
46 South Africa South Africa South Africa 
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Chapter IV: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the problem of African country’s debts was a recurring 
theme in international debate. Earlier, the aid-saving debate focused on past models that 
set foreign aid as an engine of growth. Growing critics of these models have argued that 
foreign aid substitutes domestic resources through declined savings, reduced government 
tax revenue and increased government consumption (Njeru, 2003). With regard to the 
growth effects of foreign aid, the literature is far from a consensus (Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya, 2005). In their study of the effects of IMF and World Bank lending on 
economic growth, Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) found that IMF lending has 
negative effects on growth, while there is evidence that Bank lending increases growth in 
some cases. Today, it is more and more accepted that debt crisis plays an important role 
in blocking economic growth and human development and many debates are taking place 
on strategies for debt relief. For decades, several debt relief initiatives have been 
undertaken primarily by bilateral and commercial creditors, but did not significantly 
lower African’ debt burden. 
 
The ongoing MDRI represents a step forward in the international community’s 
efforts to achieve long-term debt sustainability in the eligible HIPCs, most of which are 
African countries. However, according to Matthew (2004), judging whether developing 
country debt is sustainable involves four sets of issues: the way to measure debt burdens; 
the types of debt to include in the measurement; the way to judge payment capacity; and 
the thresholds to set to judge debt sustainability. Three elements are usually suggested for 
measuring debt burdens: (i) debt stock – the nominal amount of debt owed by a country; 
(ii) debt service – the annual amounts payable on the debt; (iii) the present value (PV) of 
debt – future debt service aggregated based on its cost in today’s money (Matthew, 
2004). 
 
The existence of multiple ways of scaling debt demonstrates that there is need for 
an objective unanimous measure, as each creditor can deliberately chose to use a measure 
that serves its interest. Discussion is often hampered by lack of empirically based 
objective criteria for an efficient and pro-development debt reduction measures. For 
example, according to United Nation (1996), the Paris Club tends to favor the low-
income countries, while commercial bank rescheduling committees accord their best 
terms to middle-income debtors. The absence of equitable burden-sharing procedures can 
inhibit creditor participation in debt reduction exercises, since no creditor wants to see its 
debt portfolio reduced in a way that aids other creditors. It is also well known that 
colonial connection, commercial interests, and the recipients’ political and ideological 
orientations account for the differences in donor support to individual countries and for 
the changes over time in a given donor’s support for particular recipients (Barro and Lee, 
2002). This paper provides a framework for scaling debt stock and gives a basis for 
setting clear principle for debt reduction measures. 
 
Using a stochastic frontier debt production function and panel data of 46 countries 
over a four-year period (1999–2002), the indebtedness index for African countries has 
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been estimated and its variation explained using variables representing a number of 
institutional, sociopolitical and geographical factors. Our findings show an average 
indebtedness index of 69, with a minimum of 3.6 (South Africa) and a maximum of 92 
(Zambia). This indicates the extent of effort that needs to be put in place to resolve the 
debt problem. The estimated indebtedness index was used to rank countries in order to 
have a clear picture of the indebtedness situation of different countries. This constitutes 
an important indicator that could help creditors and debtors’ countries to formulate and 
implement appropriate debt management policies. 
 
A serious question that emerges today is whether the relief provided under the 
HIPC initiative should be sufficient for HIPCs to embark on a path of sustainable debt. 
As stated by Gilman and Mitchell (2004), a country’s long-term debt sustainability 
depends not only on (i) the existing stock of debts and its associated debt service, but also 
on (ii) the evolution of a country’s fiscal and external repayment capacity, as well as on 
(iii) the growth and terms of new borrowing. The HIPC initiative deals only with the first 
of these elements by providing a one-time debt reduction, but this is not an ongoing 
guarantee of debt sustainability. The other two elements fall beyond the initiative’s scope 
and more under the responsibility of HIPC government and their creditors. It can easily 
be imagined that the causes that have brought African countries into this debt problem, 
will do the same after HIPC and MDRI debt relief, if not properly addressed. Clearly, 
canceling only the existing debt stock is not a comprehensive solution to the problem of 
African debt, as this takes care only of the symptoms of the disease but not the cause of 
the disease. Hence, a more comprehensive solution towards long-term debt sustainability 
will have to also tackle its determinants.  
 
The results of this paper identify some relevant factors. We found that the 
indebtedness across countries and regions vary greatly, reflecting different country 
conditions, institutions, and politico-historical factors. In particular, our results indicate 
that the geographical location, military instability, civil liberty, and corruption level have 
a significant impact on a country’s indebtedness. These results have three important 
implications for policy targeting.  
 
First, countries recovering from war appear to be (in the average) less indebted 
than non-war countries. This is not necessarily surprising as war countries constitute a 
major risk and are generally excluded from international support. However, the huge 
needs during the postwar reconstruction might expose them to an excessive indebtedness. 
There is therefore need for early assistance in the management of internal resource and 
external loans in these countries. 
 
Second, we also found countries rated ‘politically free’ to be relatively less indebted. 
On the other hand, we found a positive correlation between indebtedness situation and 
corruption indexes, evidencing that corrupt countries are more indebted. This 
corroborates other recent findings and restated that bad governance is a main driving 
force of indebtedness in Africa. Beyond the short-term targets by the HIPC initiative, 
sustainable measures should be put into place by both debtors and creditors to ensure that 
the debt problem does not recur in the future. In this regard, particular attention should be 
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given to dictatorial countries and countries with bad governance systems. In this regard, 
the following issues should be considered: (a) encourage these countries to establish 
and/or enforce laws that regulate borrowing and prevent the accumulation of 
unsustainable debt; (b) parliaments of debtor countries (as well as of the creditor 
countries) should take a more active role in approving loans; and (c) civil society 
involvement could also be considered in monitoring loans to ensure that financial 
resources are being appropriately used. Multilateral debts were identified to be more 
correlated to corrupt countries than with other creditors. Given that the World Bank, 
African Development Bank Group, and the IMF are the three major multilateral donors, 
this result should draw attention to these institutions’ loan eligibility policies as well as 
these institutions’ role in promoting good governance in Africa. 
 
Third, the paper also highlights regional difference in terms of indebtedness. It 
appears that the three countries from the Southern part of the continent (dominated by 
South Africa) have a relatively lower indebtedness than the Northern African countries. 
This gives a clear picture of the geography of indebtedness in Africa. These regional 
differences have implications on the type and extent of interventions needed in each 
region and should guide future interventions by development agencies. 
 
Globally, our findings restated the fact that efforts are needed not only from 
within the countries and regions, but also from the international community to ensure that 
the right mixture of policies are put in place to tackle debt crisis in Africa. However, debt 
management has several facets. Policymakers of different countries must also be able to 
calculate the debt supporting capacity of their country through realistic appraisal of 
export capacity. They must also account for what are the appropriate forms of borrowing 
for different types of projects and objectives. Finally, the economic planning process will 
require that the projected evolution of the economy takes into account the changes in 
macro-economic variables over time and that their impact on the country’s debt servicing 
capacity be assessed. 
 
African countries also face the challenge of preventing excessive debt and 
absorbing loans received. This suggests that there is a need to move away from 
discussing the debt problem at aggregate levels alone, but also at the level of projects and 
programs to gather lessons from success and failures. A promising possibility might be to 
put efforts in building capacity in debt management and monitoring, both at the budget 
level and at the level of individual projects and programs. Addressing all these constraints 
is imperative if the debt crisis is not to be perpetuated. Only a truly exit solution will 
really encourage the productive sector, which would generate wealth internally to reduce 
poverty and enhance development of African countries. 
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Annex: Data Specifications 
 
To conduct our analysis, panel data on debts for 1999–2003 was collected from 
“Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank Statistics on External Debt” website. This is one of 
the most complete debt datasets and was designed to facilitate timely and frequent access 
by a broad range of users to one data set that brings together data that are currently 
compiled and published by the contributing international agencies on components of 
external debt and international reserve assets. The output of the production function is the 
amount of total debt outstanding at the end of each period (debt stock of countries). The 
total debt considered here is the sum of stocks of “official bilateral loans” and “total 
multilateral claims”. Multilateral claims cover data for African Development Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, use of IMF credit, and World 
Bank loans (i.e., from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA)). Official bilateral loans 
represent the outstanding debt on loans, other than direct export credits, extended by 
governments, which are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These are 
concessional loans and other loans provided mainly for developmental purposes by the 
21 member countries of the DAC. 
 
The debt data was complemented by data on geographic location, colonial 
heritage, some governance indictors, population, exports of goods and services, foreign 
direct investment, and gross capital formation; mostly drawn from the African 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003).  
 
• Geographical location: It is expected that due to difference in natural resource 
endowment, geographical location will have an impact on the indebtedness status of 
countries. 
 
• Colonial heritage: Countries were grouped according to their colonial heritage. It is 
well known that colonial connection accounts for the differences in donor support 
to individual countries and for the changes over time in a given donor’s support 
for particular recipients (Barro and Lee, 2001; Berthelemy, 2004). 
 
• Political right and civil liberties: Indexes of political freedom that “freedom house” 
has published for each sampled country was used. Each year, since 1972, based on a 
series of checklists relating to political rights and civil liberties, we have used a 
dummy variable indicating whether a country has been rated as “free” or not. 
 
• Conflict: A dummy variable was used to characterize countries that have 
experienced a major civil war in the course of the last two decades. We have ranked 
11 countries in a group of those who have experienced a major civil war. 
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• Exports of goods and services: The nominal value of all goods and services 
provided to the rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, travel, 
and other nonfactor services. 
 
• Foreign direct investment: The amount invested or reinvested by nonresidents to 
acquire a lasting interest in enterprises in which they exercise significant 
managerial control. Investment includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, and 
other capital. The net figures subtract the value of direct investment abroad by 
residents of the reporting country. 
 
• Gross capital formation: The amount of gross domestic fixed capital formation 
plus net changes in the level of inventories. Gross capita formation comprises 
outlays by the public sector and the private sector. 
 
Finally, using information on the structure of production in the form of gross 
domestic product and its components by industrial origin, we have generated for each 
year and each country, the values added in agriculture, industry, and services sectors. 
Value added in agriculture comprises the gross output of forestry, hunting, and fishing 
less the value of their intermediate inputs. Value added in industry comprises the gross 
output of mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas, less the value 
of their intermediate inputs. Value added in services consists of gross output of all other 
branches of economic activity, including government, less the value of their intermediate 
inputs. 
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